Re: crypto delay (Notes from Non-meeting)

On Wed, Apr 03, 2002 at 05:10:11PM -0500, Henning Schulzrinne wrote:
> This all has very little do with crypto processing. As the last few
> messages tried to show, it's a matter of message exchanges and
> reliability.

I mostly agree. I do think there's an authorization requirement for
revealing location information when the call may not be what the user
intended. (Think about a hyperlink that fetches an image from
tel://sos, causing the user to reveal their location to a set of
machines involved in call setup.)

> Emergency calls are probably the single most important reason that
> people care about location; most everything else is somewhere between
> toy and "nice to have". Basically saying "we'll figure out later if this
> works, if not, well, you just have to wait a few years" is not an
> acceptable answer, methinks.

I care about location because I fully expect that its going to be
revealed all over the place, after its been installed for emergency
use. I don't see a way to resolve privacy with emergency use; the
constraints may be sufficient that we say "If you think you're calling
an emergency line, turn off all privacy."

> The emergency call problem is actually pretty simple. It only gets to be
> hard if you put artificial constraints on it that no real user much
> cares about (as witnessed by real, existing systems).

So are there privacy constraints around revealing your information to
what you think is a PSAP that you think you want to dial? If not,
can the protocol simply state "emergency call: no privacy"? Do we
need a protocol message for that?

Adam
Received on Wed Apr 3 17:48:30 2002