Re: crypto delay (Notes from Non-meeting)

On Wed, Apr 03, 2002 at 02:13:01PM -0600, James M. Polk wrote:
> At 09:50 AM 4/3/2002 -0500, Adam Shostack wrote:
> >On Wed, Apr 03, 2002 at 08:27:56AM -0500, Rosen, Brian wrote:
>
> >> >
> >> One of the "users", probably the first user, of the geopriv object
> >> is emergency calls in SIP.
> >
> >Perhaps this is a mistake? I think that emergency calling is complex,
> >and I'm far more concerned about my non-emergency privacy.
>
> Are you suggesting we now are looking at two solutions (because you just broke
> the problem up into two problems)?

I'm suggesting that the emergency use problem may be really hard, and it
may be worth looking at the non-emergency use cases as first user.
Thats still a hard problem, and if we can solve it, we may learn
things that we can apply to the emergency problem.

> >I'm also interested in trying, and would like to throw out the
> >suggestion that we might specify a level of crypto which is secure,
> >and offer nothing on slower processors.
>
> Now, how is a single protocol (which GEOPRIV is chartered to create) going to
> tell the power *and* load of each processor before determining that crypto is
> or isn't required? Or am I misreading your comment?

I think you're misreading my comment. Brian suggested that we have to
accomodate the lowest power processors out there with geopriv. I'm
suggesting that we might design a secure protocol, and if the device
can't accomodate it, too bad. We can always find a smaller, slower
device, on which someone may reasonably want to run GEOPRIV (say those
Hitachi 1/2 mm chips); should we lower the security of everyone's
system to accomodate those small processors?

Adam
Received on Wed Apr 3 15:35:34 2002