RE: crypto delay (Notes from Non-meeting)

Ever waited for help?

A second is a very long time, a VERY long time when you need help.
Yes, the RESPONSE (actual people) takes minutes or longer, but
you usually get an answer from an emergency center in a second or so.

I think you can assume your requirement is something on the order of
250 ms if there is in fact an authentication requirement for emergency
calls. That's pretty long, but I suspect we won't get too many yelps
over it. But... keep reading.

The kind of information you need to deal with false alarms doesn't involve
crypto authentication with the end device that this spec will deal with.
There are other mechanisms that are applicable.

Can you cite any evidence that authentication of the emergency center by
the end device is a requirement?

I don't think strong authentication is a requirement for providing location
with emergency calls. I'm pretty sure the requirement is actually that
even if any authentication fails you must supply location on an emergency
call.
I'm not opposed to trying to get reasonable two way authentication done
as long as the call goes through, with location, in under a second,
without any user action, even if authentication fails. We can put up some
kind of caution display maybe.

Brian

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andrew Daviel [mailto:andrew@daviel.org]
> Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2002 12:34 AM
> To: Rosen, Brian
> Cc: geopriv@mail.apps.ietf.org
> Subject: RE: crypto delay (Notes from Non-meeting)
>
>
> On Wed, 20 Mar 2002, Rosen, Brian wrote:
>
> > 3) Impractical to use
> > takes seconds to verify the signature on the
> > processors in the devices. Cannot add a second
> > to post dial delay
>
>
> Just how much time is considered important in emergency calls ?
> If there are humans in the loop who don't know each other, or maybe
> even speak the same language fluently, we're talking tens of
> seconds at
> least, maybe minutes. Emergency services can't put a response together
> that fast, in any case. A few seconds taken to authenticate a location
> and reduce the incidence of false alarms is going to save
> time and lives
> in the long run.
> There is perhaps an issue if the caller believes the
> equipment is broken
> and tries to reconnect, or abandons it altogether. This might
> be obviated
> by some display or audible feedback of call/authentication progress.
>
>
> --
> Andrew Daviel
>
>
Received on Tue Apr 2 08:00:52 2002