RE: Requirements Document

I think this is insufficient, because I think there can be
delegation services you trust. Think of an underpowered
remote device trying to let several services track him.
He would prefer to delegate to a service that could supply
location updates to all he authorizes the delegator to
serve. He only supplies his report to the delegator.

Although I wouldn't mandate it's use, it is possible to
encrypt the report such that anyone the user didn't
authorize couldn't decrypt it. Works, but may be
too expensive to use in lots of cases. Of course,
those he did authorize could subsequently reveal to anyone
else, but that's the nature of secrets.

Brian

> -----Original Message-----
> From: john.loughney@nokia.com [mailto:john.loughney@nokia.com]
> Sent: Thursday, August 30, 2001 10:46 AM
> To: randy@psg.com
> Cc: geopriv@mail.apps.ietf.org
> Subject: RE: Requirements Document
>
>
> Hi Randy,
>
> > and i see it as a general issue of delegation of authority,
> > with its own set of attendant authentication and authorization
> > issues. e.g. i want to know to what agent i am delegating, and
> > to be able to restrict that agent's abilities to act in my place,
> > in to whom they reveal, what they reveal, and if and what they
> > may subdelegate.
>
> My general comment is that when you delegate something,
> most likely you will not be able to control what your delegate
> does. I think delegation usually (always ?) introduces
> security & privacy problems.
>
> The only way that I could see this working would be that the
> delegate would not be able to understand the location information
> without consulting you. So, in effect, this would mean that your
> delegate is essentially only screening your calls. Is this
> sufficient?
>
> John
>
Received on Thu Aug 30 10:58:13 2001